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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
EVA EISNER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal
Corporation,
Defendant, Third-Party
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case No.

7675

vs.

LEO BONNERU,
Third Party Defendant
and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The parties herein will be referred to as follows :
plaintiff and appellant will be referred to as plaintiff,
and both defendant and third party plaintiff and third
party defendant will be referred to as defendants.
This appeal arises out of a judgment of dis1nissal
with prejudice at the close of plaintiff's case.
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STArEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff, a woman 55 years of age, was walking in a
westerly direction on the south side of Third South
Street on the 26th day of November, 1949, at approximately 10:30 A.M. It was a Saturday and the morning
on which the Santa Claus parade was being conducted
in downtown Salt Lake (R. 24, 25). Plaintiff was approximately in front of the Fitwell Artificial Limb Company's
place of business at 125 West 3rd South, when a large
group of children going east met her. She stepped a
little to the north to avoid them and into a deep hole
in the sidewalk, which caused her to fall forward onto
a water meter lid, a few feet 'vest of the hole. As a
result of her fall, plaintiff suffered a skinned face,
bruises and abrasions on her right side and a broken
right wrist (R. 26).
Plaintiff had lived and resided for many years a
short distance "\vest of the place where she fell and was
familiar with the sidewalk (R. 28). There were approximately 50 or 60 children, some running and some walking, in the crowd that met plaintiff (R. 29). Plaintiff
did not look to the north as she stepped aside, but was
watching the children (R. 46).

She did not see the

hole at the time she stepped into it (R. 47). The children did not run into plaintiff or touch her, but plaintiff
was carefully watching the children as they passed to
prevent them running into her (R. 48).
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It was stipulated at the trial that defendant Salt
Lake City and defendant Leo Bonneru had both excavated near the point where plaintiff fell. Salt Lake
City on October 21, 1948 excavated a hole for the purpose of installing the 'vater meter manhole. On September 28, 1948 the permit was issued by Salt Lake City to
the defendant Leo Bonneru to excavate for sewer line
and install a sewer at the Fitwell place of business (R.
18, 19). The excavation for the sewer line was completed on October 9, 1948 (R. 75). The depressed area
covered the entire north side of a cement slab. Plaintiff
testified that the area where she fell had been in the
same condition about a year prior to her fall. Its condition had been the same ever since the Artificial Limb
building was finished and the sewer pipes installed (R.
41).
The defect into which plaintiff fell consists of a
hole and depressed area along the edge of the side of
the cement slab on which plaintiff was walking. At the
point where plaintiff fell, the sidewalk for one cement
slah narrows from its usual width of two cement slabs
to a single cement slab. This condition is revealed and
illustrated by plaintiff's Exhibits "E" and "F".
The hole was 8 inches deep, was immediately adjacent to the north side of the cement slab, sloped from
the water meter lid to the east and was deepest on the
east side where plaintiff n1arked the place she stepped
into it (R. 71).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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At the close of plaintiff's evidence defendant Salt
Lake City moved the court for a directed verdict of no
cause of action, on the ground that the evidence showed
conclusively that plaintiff herself was guilty of contributory negligence (R. 78). The motion was granted,
the court stating that in his opinion the evidence conclusively showed that the accident was caused at least
in part by the negligence of plaintiff herself, and thereupon plaintiff's cause of action was dismissed with
prejudice (R. 79, 80).

SUMMARY OF ARGUME·NT

POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING AS MATTER OF LAW
THAT PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT.

ARGUMENT

POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING AS MATTER OF LA'V
THAT PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT.

The basic proposition which is presented for the
court's consideration in this appeal is whether or not
the plaintiff, being familiar with the defect in the city
sidewalk, was as matter of law contributorily negligent
in attempting to "'. .alk past the defect at a time when
a large number of small children were meeting and
passing her. There is no dispute concerning the negligence of both defendants. Apparently it is conceded
that to allow the hole into which plaintiff stepped to
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remain along the north edge of the cement slab for over
a year, would be negligence on the part of both defendants.
Plaintiff has examined a great number of cases and
all seem to be uniform in their holding that the mere
fact that a person knows or is aware of a defect in a
public sidewalk into which he falls, does not show contributory negligence as matter of law.
A case illustrating these holdings is Smith v. City
of Tacoma, 163 Wash. 626, 1 P. 2d 870, 871. Plaintiff

was familiar with the defect in the sidewalk and had
traveled over it for a long period of time. She had
just crossed it a fe,v minutes before on her way to shop
and it 'vas daylight. The defendant contended that they
should have j1;1dgment notwithstanding the verdict because of contributory negligence. The Supreme Court
of Washington refused to grant such a motion and states
the rule of law applicable in the following language:
"'The mere fact that the appellant was aware
of the defective condition of the sidewalk when
the accident occurred is not per se conclusive of
negligence on his part, though it was competent
evidence on the question of contributory negligence. * * * All that the law required was the
exercise of such care and caution as a person of
ordinary prudence would use under similar circunlstances.' "
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Plaintiff submits that the quoted language is an
obvious, sound and applicable principle and should be
applied to the present case.
Many of the cases in which the principle that knowledge alone is not sufficient to make a person contributorily negligent as matter of law, base their ruling on
the fact that an injured person may have forgotten
about the defect or may have had their attentions temporarily diverted from the defect. All agree that the
only standard to which plaintiff must conform is that
of a reasonable and prudent person under like or similar
circumstances.
There are hundreds of types of diversions and distractions which have been ruled by the courts as suffi.
cient to justify a jury in finding that the injured person
was not contributorily negligent as matter of law. A few
of those cases which are near to the facts of the present
case are cited and discussed herein as illustrations of
the principle.
Denton v. City of Twin Falls, 54 Idaho 35, 28 P. 2d
· 202, 203, involved a fall on a raised portion of the sidewalk in Twin Falls. Plaintiff therein stated as follows
in answer to a question regarding his state of mind concerning the defect of which he had knowledge.

" 'Q. Yes, You had the two young ladies with
you, and you knew that this place was very dangerous; but you were not paying very much attention to the girls; and yet you think you must
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have forgotten about that place' Is that correct?
A. \\!.,.ell, I had crossed over the place a number
of times and had got kind of used to going over it;
yet I knew that anyone had to take especial care
in going over that place without stumbling and
falling.'

" 'Q. And what happened when you got up
in the immediate vicinity of this 812 Fourth Avenue West, ~Ir. Denton' A. Well, I was just walking along there and I came up by No. 812, and
there was some boys out there in the yard playing and holloring, and just as I went to pass
over this break one of them yelled out, and it
kind of startled me and I looked around to see
what was going on, and the thing that I next
knew I was getting up.'

"'Q. Well, what I am trying to get at, Mr.
Denton, what was the reason that you lost your
footing and fell' A. Well, I stumped my foot over
this broken place there in the walk and fell.'
" 'Q. Now, you stated to your counsel, in
answer to a question that there was some outcry
or some yell from some of the children playing
in a yard nearby. Do you remember that' A. Yes,
sir.' "
Defendant's motion for judgment of nonsuit and the
contention that plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence as matter of law was overruled.
The Supreme Court of Idaho on appeal reviewed
at great length the doctrine of temporary forgetfulness
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in relation to contributory negligence and stated at page
204 the rule which they applied in affirming the judgment for plaintiff:
"Touching the question of temporary forgetfulness, in another 'sidewalk' case, Butland v.
City of Caldwell, 51 Idaho, 483, 488, 6 P. (2d) 493,
496, this court expressed itself as follows: 'Temporary forgetfulness, inattention, or distraction
do not generally constitute contributory negligence. 'When a person has exercised the care
and caution which an ordinarily prudent person
would have exercised under the same or similar
circumstances, he is not negligent merely because
he temporarily forgot or was inattentive to a
known danger.' 45 C. J. 950, and authorities cited.
Ordinary care is all that is required. 45 .c. J. 947,
949, and authorities cited. Osier v. Consumers'
Co., 42 Idaho, 789, 796, 248 P. 438; Giffen v. City
of Lewiston, 6 Idaho, 231, 55 P. 545.' "
In Cox v. City of Coffeyville, 153 Kan. 392, 110 P.
2d 772, the Supreme C-ourt reversed a ruling by a lower
court which had sustained a demurrer to plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff was walking on the sidewalk and when
he came alongside of the hole in the sidewalk into which
he fell, he met one Moore carrying an armload of groceries. Moore passed plaintiff so close that plaintiff fell
into the hole. There was no evidence that Moore bumped
plaintiff into the hole, but only that he passed close to
plaintiff and plaintiff stepped aside to avoid a collision
and fell into the hole. At the time plaintiff was living
within 40 feet of the hole, knew of its existence from the
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many times that he had walked along the sidewalk, and
immediately prior to n1eeting him, was walking to the side
of the hole. The Kansas Court stated the general principle that the mere knowledge on the part of plaintiff did
not conclusively show contributory negligence, and then
cited an earlier Kansas case entitled City of Olathe v.
Mi.zee, 48 Kan. 435, 29 P. 754, 30 Am. St. Rep. 308, which
set forth the principle and general rule that a person
whose faculties of observation or memory are temporarily distracted as regards a dangerous condition is
virtually in the same mental position as one who has
never acquired knowledge of such dangerous condition.
Plaintiff submits that the Cox case sets forth sound,
api)licable prineiples of la\v and should be adopted
by this court and made the law of Utah.
In support of the general principle, the Kansas
Court cites 13 A.L.R. 87, wherein excuses for failure to
observe and avoid defect or obstruction is annotated.
Three basic cases set forth the principle and are cited
in the annotation. They are: Thomas v. New Y ark, 28
Hun(N.Y.) 110; Barr v. Fairfax, 156 Mo. App. 295, 137
S.W. 631; Kenyon v. Mondovi, 98 Wis. 50, 73 N.W. 314.
In Thomas v. New Y ark, it was ruled that a person
whose attention was diverted from a dangerous condition by a crowd was not guilty of contributory negligence
as matter of law.
In Barr v. Fairfax the approach of another person
diverted plaintiff's attention from the defect.
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In Kenyon v. Mondovi the pedestrian's attention was
diverted by being accosted by a friend.
An interesting case in point in one of our neighboring jurisdictions is Mullins v. City of Butte, 93 Mont. 601,
20 P. 2d 626, 627. Plaintiff was a pregnant woman who
fell near her home on a public sidewalk with which she
was very familiar and about which she had been warned
immediately prior to her fall. The diversion which distracted her attention from the dangerous condition was
the crying of her five year old son. The defect in the
sidewalk upon which plaintiff fell was a cracked and
broken condition, which had been present for more than
a year and over which the plaintiff had passed at various
times during a six month period immediately preceding
her fall. The Supreme Court of Montana in quoting the
rules for which plaintiff contends states:
"It is also urged that the plaintiff was guilty
of contributory negligence because she had knowledge that the sidewalk was defective; also as a
result of the warning by her husband. Mere
knowledge of an offending .instrumentality does
not constitute contributory negligence. Neilson v.
Missoula Creamery Co., 59 Mont. 270, 196 P. 357.
The attention of a pedestrian may be diverted
by various causes, but a mere temporary diversion
does not 1nake him guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. 7 McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, 261; Smith v. Clayton Construction Co., 189 Wis. 91, 206 N. W. 67.
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•'A number of photographs of the sidewalk
were received in evidence, but these are not a part
of the record in this court.
HlTnder the facts and circumstances presented
by the record, we are entirely unwilling to say
that the plaintiff is shown to have been negligent
as a matter of law. The court properly submitted
the question of contributory negligence to the
jury."
Three California cases which involve somewhat simi-:lar facts and which applied the principle for which plaintiff here contends are Barry v. Terkildsen, 72 Cal. 254,
13 P. 657; Van Praag v. Gale, 107 Cal. 438, 40 P. 555;
Du l"al v. Boos Bros . Cafeteria Co., 45 Cal. App. 377,
187 P. 767.
In Barry v. Terkildsen plaintiff's attention was attracted to some children playing in the street at the
moment she stepped into the open hole. The court held
that she was not guilty of contributory negligence as
matter of law.
In Van Praag v. Gale plaintiff was reading a newspaper and walked into an open doorway. The question
of contributory negligence was again ruled as one of fact
for the jury to decide.
In Du Val v. Boos Bros. Cafeteria Co. plaintiff fell
into an open elevator shaft at a time when her attention
was attracted to something she was passing on the highway. Again the question of contributory negligence was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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properly submitted to the jury. At page 769 the court
sets forth the following interesting statement of fact and
principles applicable:
"In the present case the respondent testified
that when 10 or 12 feet from the elevator doors she
saw they were closed. Her attention being attracted to something she was passing, she turned
her head, and as she walked that short distance,
one of the doors was raised from the pitfall directly in her pathway and into which she fell.
As was said in the opinion in Van Praag v. Gale :
" 'To some minds probably the conclusion
would seem irresistible that he· who, with eyes to
see, in broad daylight walks into an open trapdoor
in the sidewalk is lacking in that care and caution
which characterizes the man of ordinary prudence.
Others may well reason that plaintiff was entitled
to a safe passage over a walk prepared by the
public for the accommodation of all its citizens.'
"The fact that different minds might reach
(different conclusions upon the question of the
respondent's caution disposes of all the contentions of the appellants based on the assumption
that contributory negligence was shown as a matter of law, as well as their contentions regarding
the instructions on the subject given and refused.
Mere abstraction on the part of a pedestrian does
not constitute contributory negligence. Robinson
v. Pioche, 5 Cal. 461 ; Perkins v. Sunset Tel. & Tel.
Co., 155 Cal. 722, 103 Pac. 190. The question of
contributory negligence was properly submitted
to the jury under correct instructions."
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Numerous other cases which discussed other types
of distractions and which hold that such distractions are
sufficient to make a jury question on the matter of contributory negligence are cited and discussed at 70 A.L.R.
1388.
An interesting case discussing the proposition that
the plaintiff would be guilty of contributory negligence if
she had knowledge of the defect causing her fall is the
case of Wolverton v. Village of Saranac, 171 Mich.419,
137 N. W. 211. There plaintiff while attempting to avoid
son1e of the holes in the sidewalk, stepped into a larger
hole and was thrown onto the sidewalk and seriously
injured. The Michigan court in its decision stated that
the fact that the plaintiff had the defect specifically in
mind would not necessarily change the issue from one
of fact to one of law. It would only affect the degree of
care which plaintiff should exercise.
See also Carton v. City of Philadelphia, 146 Pa.
Super. Ct. 381, 22 A. 2d 603.
From the foregoing authorities it is plain that contributory negligence under the evidence in this case is
a question of fact for the jury to decide. The decision
of the court that plaintiff was contributorily negligent
as matter of law unlawfully deprives plaintiff of her
constitutional right to a jury trial.
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the court should
reverse the decision of the trial court and remand plaintiff's cause of action to the District Court for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,

RAWLINGS, WALLACE, BLACK,
ROBERTS & BLACK,
DWIGHT L. KING,
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant,

530 Judge Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah.
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Attorneys for Third Party
Defendant and Respondent.
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